2026年1月12日，欧盟委员会发布了一份《指导文件》，就针对来自中国的电池电动汽车/BEVs 所适用的反补贴税措施背景下，提交价格承诺要约事宜提供指引。
该《指导文件》为向欧盟出口 BEV 的中国出口商提供了关于提交价格承诺要约（“UT”）的一般性指导，涵盖了承诺要约中需要考虑的多个方面，包括最低进口价格、销售渠道、交叉补偿以及未来在欧盟的投资等问题。
每一份价格承诺要约均适用相同的法律评估标准。欧盟委员会将依据不歧视原则并按照WTO规则，对每一份要约进行客观、公正的评估。
背景：2024年10月29日，欧盟委员会完成了针对来自中国的BEV进口产品的反补贴调查，并最终决定征收7.8%至35.3%不等的最终反补贴税。该《指导文件》的发布，正是继欧盟委员会与中国商务部在调查期间持续开展磋商与讨论之后的结果。
《指导文件》文本：欧委会官网链接请见：https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-issues-guidance-document-submission-price-undertaking-offers-battery-electric-vehicles-2026-01-12_en)； 本文下翻可阅读双语全文。
指导文件的规则简而言之为：如相关进口车企不想交7.8%–35.3%的反补贴税，可以谈；但车企须将价格、车型、销售渠道、未来投资都摊在阳光下，而且要让欧盟随时能查账。
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Guidance document on submission of price undertaking offers
关于提交价格承诺要约的指导文件（全文）
This document is intended to provide guidance to Chinese exporters that may consider price undertaking offers (UT offers) for exports of battery electric vehicles for passengers (BEVs) to the EU, which are currently subject to countervailing duties.
Each UT offer is assessed against the same legal criteria laid down in the EU basic anti-subsidy Regulation according to WTO rules, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner: the UT offer must be adequate to eliminate the injurious effects of the subsidies and provide equivalent effect to duties; be practicable; mitigate the risk of cross-compensation; and be in accordance with general policy considerations.
By following the points outlined in this guidance, exporters can identify and address, in practical terms and customised for this particular case, relevant issues, when considering possible undertaking offers.
本文件旨在为可能考虑就出口至欧盟的乘用纯电动汽车（battery electric vehicles for passengers，BEVs）提交价格承诺要约（price undertaking offers，UT 要约）的中国出口商提供指导。目前，该类产品正适用反补贴税措施。
每一份 UT 要约均依据欧盟《基本反补贴条例》中依照世界贸易组织（WTO）规则确立的相同法律标准进行评估，评估应当是客观且不具歧视性的。UT 要约必须能够消除补贴所造成的损害性影响，并产生与征收反补贴税等同的效果；同时应具有可操作性，能够降低交叉补偿风险，并符合一般政策考量。
通过遵循本指导文件所列要点，出口商在考虑可能的承诺要约时，可以从实践层面出发，并结合本案的具体情况，识别并处理相关问题。
I. Individually or jointly submitted offers
一、单独提交或联合提交的要约
UTs submitted by an individual company must address the specific situation of this company in relation the above-mentioned criteria. In case of a UT submitted jointly by several companies, the UT must take into account each individual company’s specifics.
由单一公司提交的 UT 要约，必须针对该公司在上述评估标准下的具体情况作出说明。若 UT 要约由多家公司联合提交，则该要约必须充分考虑并反映每一家公司的具体情况。
II. Product Coverage
二、产品范围
Exporters will decide on the product coverage of their UT offer. Companies that export to the EU one or few BEV models would present a lower risk of cross-compensation in a possible UT offer. An UT offer covering all products subject to the measures exported to the EU would limit the risk of cross-compensation within the product concerned.
Similarly, companies that do not export any other products (for example hybrid vehicles) to the same customers in the EU would limit the risk of cross compensation with products that are outside the scope of the measures. On the contrary, a broad range of BEV models, or exports of products not under measures to the same customers, would increase the risk of cross-compensation.
出口商可自行决定其 UT 要约所涵盖的产品范围。仅向欧盟出口一款或少数几款 BEV 车型的公司，在可能的 UT 要约中所面临的交叉补偿风险较低。涵盖所有受措施约束并出口至欧盟的产品的 UT 要约，可在所涉产品范围内降低交叉补偿风险。
同样地，如公司未向欧盟的同一客户出口其他产品（例如混合动力汽车），则可降低与措施范围之外产品之间发生交叉补偿的风险。相反，若 BEV 车型种类范围较广，或同时向同一客户出口未受措施约束的其他产品，则交叉补偿风险将相应增加。
III. Minimum Import Price
三、最低进口价格（MIP）
The Minimum Import Price (MIP) must be set at a level appropriate to remove the injurious effects of the subsidisation. Given the large variations of the product (models, configuration options) significantly impacting the sales prices, specific MIPs are required for each model and configuration option.
Two possible pathways to determine the MIP are:• based on the CIF prices of the exporter in question in the investigation period, increased by the relevant countervailing duty margin; or• based on the EU sales price of a non-subsidised EU-produced BEV of the same or closely resembling product type, including SG&A and a reasonable profit margin.
The more limited the variety in models and configuration options, the more practicable the UT.
最低进口价格（Minimum Import Price，MIP）必须设定在足以消除补贴所造成的损害性影响的适当水平。鉴于不同车型及配置选项之间存在显著差异，并对销售价格产生重大影响，因此需要针对每一款车型及其具体配置分别设定 MIP。
确定 MIP 可采用两种可能路径：一是以相关出口商在导致征收措施的调查期间内的 CIF 价格为基础，并在此基础上加上相应的反补贴税率；二是以欧盟境内生产的、未受补贴的同类或高度相似 BEV 产品在欧盟市场的销售价格为基础，该价格应包含销售、一般及管理费用（SG&A）以及合理的利润率。
车型及配置选项的多样性越有限，UT 要约在实践中的可操作性就越强。
IV. Annual Volumes
四、年度数量
Exporters may decide to include a commitment of an annual volume as an element that could mitigate concerns on the risk of cross-compensation. Such a commitment could also reinforce the offer in addressing the injurious subsidisation.
出口商可决定在 UT 要约中纳入年度数量承诺，以缓解对交叉补偿风险的顾虑。该等数量承诺亦可强化要约在充分应对补贴损害方面的效果。
V. Validity Period
五、有效期
A limited duration of the application of the UT (e.g. a fixed time or conditional upon the life cycle of a particular model) is a further possibility to mitigate the risk of cross-compensation in time.
限制 UT 的适用期限（例如设定固定期限，或与某一特定车型的生命周期挂钩），也是在时间维度上降低交叉补偿风险的另一种方式。
VI. Sales Price in the EU
六、欧盟境内销售价格
The relevant sales price is the price when sold to the first independent customer in the EU, and each transaction must comply with the relevant MIP. Where products are resold by an importer related to the exporter, all costs incurred after import clearance must be deducted to ensure comparability with the MIP, and the related importer must demonstrate actual SG&A and a reasonable profit margin.
Direct sales to unrelated importers therefore allow a simpler and more practicable comparison with the MIP. Conversely, complex sales channels involving related distributors reduce practicability due to price deductions and monitoring requirements.
此处所指的销售价格，是产品在欧盟境内出售给第一位独立客户时的价格，每一笔交易均必须符合相应的 MIP 要求。若出口产品由与出口商存在关联关系的进口商在欧盟市场上再销售，则需从销售价格中扣除清关后发生的全部成本，以确保与 MIP 的可比性；同时，该关联进口商须证明其实际发生的 SG&A 成本并提供合理利润率。
因此，从 UT 要约的可操作性角度看，直接向无关联进口商销售，可更为简便地与 MIP 进行比较。相反，涉及关联分销公司的复杂销售渠道，将因价格扣减及持续监测要求而降低可操作性。
VII. Complexity of Sales Channels
七、销售渠道的复杂性
A comparatively simple corporate structure and simple organisation of the sales channels greatly simplifies determining the net sales price. This is required for comparison with the MIP. It also facilitates monitoring and verification of the exporter's compliance with the UT terms.
The degree of complexity of the distribution organisation is measured by factors such as the number of representatives in the Union market, the presence of intermediaries in the distribution chain and the variety of distribution channels (e.g. b2c sales on the internet, agency sales models, fleet sales), as well as the number of intermediaries in the sales chain between the exporter and the first independent customer in the Union.
Complex structures in distribution channels result in increased effort due to more complicated net sales price calculations, as well as the need for verifiable documentation. Additionally, the risk of cross-compensation is significantly higher.
相对简单的公司结构以及简化的销售渠道组织方式，将大大简化净销售价格的确定，而该净销售价格是用于与最低进口价格（MIP）进行比较的基础。这种结构同样有助于对出口商是否遵守 UT 条款进行监测和核查。
分销组织复杂程度可通过多项因素衡量，包括：在欧盟市场中的代表数量、分销链中是否存在中介、分销渠道的多样性（例如通过互联网进行的 B2C 销售、代理销售模式、车队销售等），以及出口商与欧盟境内第一位独立客户之间的中介层级数量。
分销渠道结构越复杂，净销售价格的计算就越复杂，并且需要提供更多可核查的文件支持。此外，交叉补偿的风险也将显著提高。
VIII. Commitment on Future EU Investments
八、关于未来在欧盟投资的承诺
Any commitment to invest in the BEV-related industries within the EU will be considered and assessed as part of the UT offer. The investment commitments in the UT must be clearly defined in terms of nature, scope, schedule and financial magnitude. Furthermore, clear, verifiable milestones should be set.
It should be borne in mind that non-compliance with such an investment commitment may constitute a breach of the UT, leading to the withdrawal of the acceptance of the UT and to the retroactive collection of duties.
任何关于在欧盟境内对 BEV 相关产业进行投资的承诺，均将作为 UT 要约的一部分予以考虑和评估。UT 中所包含的投资承诺，必须在投资的性质、范围、时间安排以及财务规模等方面作出明确界定，并应设定清晰且可核查的阶段性里程碑。
需要注意的是，未能履行该等投资承诺，可能构成对 UT 的违反，从而导致欧盟委员会撤销对 UT 的接受决定，并引发反补贴税的追溯征收。
IX. Technical Feasibility of UT
九、UT 的技术可行性
The Commission must be able to monitor and verify the company's compliance with the UT effectively. When assessing whether this is possible with reasonable administrative effort, the factors to be taken into account include:• Product complexity: number of BEV models and equipment options/trims requiring the setting of individual MIPs;• Company structure;• Sales channel complexity;• Sale of other products and/or rendering of services to the same customer (or companies related to the customer) in the Union;• Accessibility and transparency of the accounting system and business documentation of the company offering the UT for purposes of subsequent verification of information reported under UT terms.
欧盟委员会必须能够对公司是否遵守 UT 条款进行有效的监测和核查。在评估是否能够在合理的行政成本和工作量下实现上述目标时，应综合考虑以下因素：
产品复杂性：需要分别设定最低进口价格（MIP）的 BEV 车型及配置选项数量；
公司结构；
销售渠道的复杂性；
是否向欧盟境内的同一客户（或与该客户存在关联关系的公司）销售其他产品和/或提供服务；
提交 UT 的公司在会计系统及业务文件方面的可获取性与透明度，以便对其在 UT 条款下所报告的信息进行后续核查。
X. Further commitments to mitigate risk of cross-compensation
十、为降低交叉补偿风险而作出的进一步承诺
When submitting a UT offer, careful consideration should be given to whether it is possible to commit to additional measures that mitigate the risk of cross-compensation. These measures should be proportionate to the company's individual risk profile, as determined by the aforementioned circumstances.
Such measures may include:• Standardising the organisation of distribution channels;• Simplifying an existing system of sales incentives for distributors;• Creating internal workflows and documentation schemes to facilitate vehicle-specific tracking from export to sale, including any subsequent reductions in the net sales price;• Arranging for external audit of the above-mentioned organisational processes, including BEV pricing policy.
在提交 UT 要约时，应审慎评估是否可以承诺采取额外措施，以进一步降低交叉补偿风险。该等措施应与公司基于前述因素所确定的个体风险状况相匹配，并保持比例适当。
此类措施可能包括：
XI. Process
十一、程序
The submission of a formal UT offer to the Commission triggers a procedure for the assessment of the acceptability and practicability of the offer, which will be carried out expeditiously. The Commission will disclose its preliminary assessment to the interested parties for comments. On this basis, the Commission will conclude on the acceptance or not of the offer.
If the Commission decides to accept the UT offer, there would be an Implementing Decision that forms the basis for the conclusion, and an amendment of the regulation imposing the existing measures. If the Commission decides not to accept the UT, there would only be an Implementing Decision stating the reasons. In all cases, the decision making involves the voting of Member States according to comitology rules.
向欧盟委员会正式提交 UT 要约，将启动一项对该要约可接受性及可操作性进行评估的程序，该程序将以加快方式进行。欧盟委员会将向利害关系方披露其初步评估结论，并征求意见。在此基础上，委员会将决定是否接受该要约。
若委员会决定接受 UT 要约，将通过一项实施决定（Implementing Decision）作为结论依据，并对现行征收措施的相关法规作出修订；若委员会决定不接受 UT 要约，则同样将通过一项实施决定，但仅用于说明拒绝接受的理由。在所有情况下，相关决定均需依照委员会程序（comitology rules）由成员国投票作出。
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